Korupsi
Today, I was given an insider’s view into the means and machinations of Indonesian bureaucracy – and by nature of the beast, corruption. Pak David, the vice principal of the school, took me to the local police station to get me my driver’s license. To make a long story short, the equivalent of seventeen dollars and twenty-five minutes later, I had become an official, legal driver, having bypassed the official, legal Indonesian drivers’ test and the official, legal four-hour line. I entered the examination hall, and after looking over his shoulder, the administrator slipped an already completed test (with a passing score) from under his stack of papers, and handed it over for me to sign, and make official. When I asked Pak David about the matter, he gave me one of his loud, squeaky laughs in return. “It’s funny, yes? You no wait in line, they do test for you, so now you drive. Is funny, yes?”
Well, my brother Simon once gagged, “Have you heard the joke about dehydration? NO! That’s because there are no jokes about dehydration.” The same could be said for korupsi. For a government, society, and people that are trying to break free from poverty and the shackles that come with it, I don’t think corruption is a laughing matter at all. Apparently the locals don’t share my point of view.
Decades of strong bureaucratic centralism left Indonesian local-level officials unprepared and unable to conceive of governing in any democratic form. I continuously have to remind myself that Indonesia’s first “free and fair” elections were held only two years ago. Up until that point, collusion and nepotism had dictated who would run the government. A natural reaction for many of the local and regional leaders who found themselves in power was to follow the previous thirty-year Suharto example, the only model of effective leadership they really knew. Thus, the centralized corruption of the Suharto years from 1965-1998 rapidly turned to local corruption, as increased local revenues brought about through increased foreign direct investment went directly into local leaders’ pockets.
The national elections of 2004 demonstrate that post-Suharto Indonesia’s combination of optimistic reformism and cynical fatigue has led to an uncertain approach to governance. Under Sukarno, who led from independence in 1945 to Suharto’s coup-of-sorts twenty years later, the catch-word of the country was “revolution.” The following thirty-some years were dominated by promises of “development.” Under these two nation-wide umbrellas of political focus, common Indonesians began to develop a clear sense of national direction. With the economic crisis of 1997, and the four new presidents who have followed in eight years, that direction is now uncertain for most people here.
As Vickers writes, “The good intentions of genuine reformers have been drowned by a political culture in which access to power is synonymous with access to the economy” (For an excellent, relatively short introduction to contemporary Indonesia, try Vickers’ “A History of Modern Indonesia” published in 2005 by Cambridge University Press). I take this next passage from Vickers in order to illustrate exactly how destabilizing and ultimately harmful corruption has been, and can be, in Indonesia:
“The ultimate symbol of what was going wrong with [Suharto’s] New Order was its most extravagant scandal, which began late in 1995. News seeped out that the world’s largest gold deposit had been discovered in Busang, Kalimantan [Borneo]. The main foreign company involved, an obscure Canadian firm called Bre-X, ended up in a bidding war with major US companies in which more and more generous offers were made to members of the governing inner circle to see who could buy the most influence. One of the Suharto children was rumored to have been offered US$1 billion. With all the international agencies publishing accounts of Indonesia’s growing prosperity, investors felt assured of returns on their money. In true New Order style, there was of course no gold. The geologist who had signed off on the discovery mysteriously fell out of a helicopter, but the fraud was revealed late in 1996 through the actions of honest public servants and the investigations of the international media. The Suharto children… were not at all concerned that Bre-X and other companies had lost millions on the investment, or that Indonesia’s reputation was irreparably tarnished in the eyes of international investors. They had got their commissions. While some economists maintain that a level of corruption is a normal part of the operations of capitalism, the Bre-X scandal showed that the regime’s corruption was eating into the base of the economy” (my italics).
In addition to the century’s worst drought and the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Suharto’s regime was ultimately brought down my KKN – corruption, collusion and nepotism. If history teaches us anything, the people of this country struggling to develop a sense of national promise would be well-advised to start following a new path.
Well, my brother Simon once gagged, “Have you heard the joke about dehydration? NO! That’s because there are no jokes about dehydration.” The same could be said for korupsi. For a government, society, and people that are trying to break free from poverty and the shackles that come with it, I don’t think corruption is a laughing matter at all. Apparently the locals don’t share my point of view.
Decades of strong bureaucratic centralism left Indonesian local-level officials unprepared and unable to conceive of governing in any democratic form. I continuously have to remind myself that Indonesia’s first “free and fair” elections were held only two years ago. Up until that point, collusion and nepotism had dictated who would run the government. A natural reaction for many of the local and regional leaders who found themselves in power was to follow the previous thirty-year Suharto example, the only model of effective leadership they really knew. Thus, the centralized corruption of the Suharto years from 1965-1998 rapidly turned to local corruption, as increased local revenues brought about through increased foreign direct investment went directly into local leaders’ pockets.
The national elections of 2004 demonstrate that post-Suharto Indonesia’s combination of optimistic reformism and cynical fatigue has led to an uncertain approach to governance. Under Sukarno, who led from independence in 1945 to Suharto’s coup-of-sorts twenty years later, the catch-word of the country was “revolution.” The following thirty-some years were dominated by promises of “development.” Under these two nation-wide umbrellas of political focus, common Indonesians began to develop a clear sense of national direction. With the economic crisis of 1997, and the four new presidents who have followed in eight years, that direction is now uncertain for most people here.
As Vickers writes, “The good intentions of genuine reformers have been drowned by a political culture in which access to power is synonymous with access to the economy” (For an excellent, relatively short introduction to contemporary Indonesia, try Vickers’ “A History of Modern Indonesia” published in 2005 by Cambridge University Press). I take this next passage from Vickers in order to illustrate exactly how destabilizing and ultimately harmful corruption has been, and can be, in Indonesia:
“The ultimate symbol of what was going wrong with [Suharto’s] New Order was its most extravagant scandal, which began late in 1995. News seeped out that the world’s largest gold deposit had been discovered in Busang, Kalimantan [Borneo]. The main foreign company involved, an obscure Canadian firm called Bre-X, ended up in a bidding war with major US companies in which more and more generous offers were made to members of the governing inner circle to see who could buy the most influence. One of the Suharto children was rumored to have been offered US$1 billion. With all the international agencies publishing accounts of Indonesia’s growing prosperity, investors felt assured of returns on their money. In true New Order style, there was of course no gold. The geologist who had signed off on the discovery mysteriously fell out of a helicopter, but the fraud was revealed late in 1996 through the actions of honest public servants and the investigations of the international media. The Suharto children… were not at all concerned that Bre-X and other companies had lost millions on the investment, or that Indonesia’s reputation was irreparably tarnished in the eyes of international investors. They had got their commissions. While some economists maintain that a level of corruption is a normal part of the operations of capitalism, the Bre-X scandal showed that the regime’s corruption was eating into the base of the economy” (my italics).
In addition to the century’s worst drought and the Asian economic crisis of 1997, Suharto’s regime was ultimately brought down my KKN – corruption, collusion and nepotism. If history teaches us anything, the people of this country struggling to develop a sense of national promise would be well-advised to start following a new path.
posted by Nick Taranto | 3:23 AM
1 Comments:
they tried a different tactic on me.. since there was no line for me to skip that day, i guess they had to show i was gaining something that others weren't gaining in order to justify my paying a little extra. so the boss that was handling my paperwork for the driver's license took me to a separate room and put a revolver on the table. it was a mix of intimidation and an offer of protection. later, when pak david communicated to me with the same nervous laugh that there was a request for some extra money by the officer, i complied. for me, it was my bule tax. my presence as a foreigner in madiun created an unusual situation for these officers, who were probably underpaid anyway, in which they had to always keep me in mind. i didn't mind paying a little extra (17 bucks) to have the police take what i believed were a few extra steps for my convenience and protection. however, i definitely felt uncomfortable that it wasn't a formally documented transaction as the US has trained me to expect.
i also went with nelly one time to the department of education in jakarta to distribute the pay-offs for our visas. the society functions by the passing of brown envelopes.
also, one of the things i found most culturally interesting was when indonesians laugh. i found that, especially for pak david and his family, laughing comes as a way ease a situation in identifying its irony (maybe). a lot of times for me there was no irony involved, like in this bribery situation at the police office, or when bu ana (david's wife) was laughing as she told me her brother and pembantu were in a bad motorcycle accident. maybe a mix of not wanting to displease along with their conception of irony (god giving them the shaft). it's something i haven't put my finger on yet, but i would like to know your thoughts about it as you continue to have your experiences.
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